Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1953

In the Matter of the Estate of James John Latsis :
Respondents' Answer Brief
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Moss & Hyde; Mulliner, Prince & Mulliner; Attorneys for Respondents;
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Latsis, No. 7954 (Utah Supreme Court, 1953).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1899

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF
L -f~'i
~-...1

ufAii

-...'

J·---'../')

'

In the Matter of the Estate of James

John Latsis (also sometimes known
as "Latses"),
Deceased.

Case No. 7954

RESPONDENTS' ANSWER BRIEF

Respectfully submitted,
~lOSS

& HYDE
Attorneys for Respondent
Virginia Latsis Zambukos

MULLINER, PRINCE & MULLINER
Attorneys for Respondent
Utah Savings & Trust Company

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX
Page
Statcfilent --------------------------·····----------·-·----····----·--·-···------···-················

1

Statement of Points --····································--·----·-··-·-·······--------·-·······

2

!'\rgument --------------·-------------·--·-------·-·--------------------------···-··-------·--·--···-- 2
POINT 1 "'SETTLEMENT" WAS HAD IN AC·
CORDANCE WITH THE STATUTE
AND NO COMPROMISE WAS
INVOLVED ·-·------------------·-----·--------·-··--····-----····- 2
POINT II THE QUESTION OF LIMITATIONS ON
AUTHORITY OF AN ATTORNEY AP·
POINTED UNDER 75-14-25 DOES NOT
ARISE IN THIS CASE ·--------------------------·--·--- 3
POINT III THE DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION' IS
VALID ·---··············----·············-·--·-·····-····--·-·········
Conclusion ..........................................................................................

6
7

CASES CITED
Joyner et ux v. City oi Seattle (Wash.) 258 P. 479....................
Barrette v. Whitney, 36 Utah 574, 106 P. 522 ..........................
In re Ottings Estate (SO) 252 NW 740 --··---···---··················-·- 4,
In re Estate of Rice~ 111 U. 428, 182 P. 2d IlL............................
Estate of James Devoe, Deceased, Myrick's Probate Reports, p. 6
Estate of William P. Fuller, Deceased, 2 Coffey's
Probate Decisions 521 ----------···--·-·······--------·------·----··---······· 5,
In re Lux Estate (Cal.) 66 P. 30....................................................
Winona Oil Co. v. Barnes (Okla.) 200 P. 981................................

3
4

6
5
5
6
6
6

STATUTES CITED
75·11-37 UCA 195 3 ·····--·····-·····-·-·····----·-··--·····-······························ 5
ll Cal. Jur., Sec. 793, p. 1204...................................................... 6

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the Estate of Jmnes
John Latsis (also sometimes known
as "Latses"),
Deceased.

Case No. 7954

RESPONDENTS' ANSWER BRIEF

srrATE~IENT

In their Reply Brief, appellants raise new contentions
which necessitate this .A11swer Brief. Each point in appellant's Reply Brief will be discussed.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2
STATE~fENT

OF POINTS

POINT I
"SETTLEMENT" WAS HAD IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE STATUTE AND NO COMPROMISE WAS INVOLVED.

POINT II
THE QUESTION OF LIMITATIONS ON AUTHORITY
OF AN ATTORNEY APPOINTED UNDER 75-14-25 DOES
NOT ARISE IN THIS CASE.

POINT III
THE DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION IS VALID.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
"SETTLEMENT" WAS HAD IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE STATUTE AND NO COMPROMISE WAS INVOLVED.

We have no quarrel with the authorities and cases
cited by appellant as to the meaning of "settlement." Attorney Cotro-Manes had authority to represent the absent heirs in all "settlements, partitions and distribution
of (the) estate ... " This he did. Appellants wish to drag
in the question of "compromise." But no compromise
was here effected. All parties simply agreed that Ten
Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) fairly represented the
interest of the absent heirs. The Court so found and Ten
Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) was distributed to certain
heirs. This was the "settlement" of the estate so far as
appellants were concerned. They gavtl up nothing to
•'purchase peace." In fact, there wa:-; no conflict of uny
sort. ~\t one point in the probate proceedings the absent
heir~ (and the heir, other than the widow, resident in
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Salt Lake County) through their attorney, simply said,
"Our share at this tilne equals $10,000.00 in cash." The
adJ.ninistrators agreed. The Co,urt found this to be true
in fact. ~o $10,000.00 was paid frmn the estate to the
heirs other than the widow on Order of the Court. No
claim of the other heirs was surrendered for the Ten
Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00). They received every
penny they claimed. No "purchase of peace" was involved.
Joyn.er et ux v. City of Seattle (Wash.) 258 P. 479
is a tort case having to do with a prior oral contract of
settletnent later repudiated. It has no relevancy here.

POINT II
THE QUESTION OF LIMITATIONS ON AUTHORITY
OF AN ATTORNEY APPOINTED UNDER 75-14-25 DOES
NOT ARISE IN THIS CASE.

Appellants question the power and authority of Mr.
Cotro-:Manes under his appoinhnent by the Probate
Court. His authority to do \vhat ~ His authority to represent and appear for the absent heirs is not questioned.
But his authority to "cmnpromise or waive any of their
rights or claims" is challenged. With that we agree. No
attorney can waive his client's rights without authority
so to do from the client. But, as is pointed out above,
.Mr. Cotro-:Manes did not waive any right or con1promise
any claim. He merely agreed with the ad1ninistrators and
advised the Court in his representative capacity and as an
officer of the Court, that in his opinion, based on due inquiry and deliberation, that Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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000.00) represented a fair and adequate a1nount to be
paid over to the other heirs (other than the widow) at
that time. Mr. Cotro-Manes gave up nothing belonging to
his "clients." He and the administrators jointly advised
the Court that Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) was a
fair settlement for said heirs, in their opinion. But Mr.
Cotro-Manes' action did not bind the Court. It simply
was advisory and could have been rejected. However,
the Court found as a fact that Ten Thousand Dollars
($10,000.00) was a fair settlement and that it was in the
best interest of the heirs to receive it at that time. The
court ordered the settlement and payment by the administrators of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) to the
Hellenic Bank or the American Express Company for
transmission to the heirs under the direction of Mr.
Cotro-Manes. Consequently, the settlement made was
by the Court and not by Mr. Cotro-Manes.

The question, therefore, is "did the Court have
power to make the settlement as it did~" There can be
no question on that. The function of the Probate Court
is to deterinine heirship, to determine distributive shares,
and to make distribution of estates. The Court acts in
rem. Barrette v. Whitney, 36 Utah 574, 106 P. 522; In re
Ottings Estate (SD) 252 NW 740. At common law aliens
had no rights of heirship, but our statute grants rights
of inheritance to aliens. However, heirship is determined
by the Court; so also are distributive shares so determined. Suppose that the Greek heirs were unknown to
the Court and to the administrators (no question of
fraud) and suppose the estate had been filed for probate.
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Suppose all statutory notices were given and the Court
determined the heirs, leaving out the Greek citizens.
Suppose the estate was then distributed to the heirs found
by the Court and the adn1inistrators were discharged and
the estate closed. \Vould not this action be final and
conclusive f \Y ould not the Greek heirs be forever barred
from asserting their clain1s '? The Court does have power
to distribute the estate in accordance with statute and
cut off unknown heirs. Equally true it is that the Court
ean detennine the distributive share due known heirs and
having found said distributive share can order distribution. An heir agrieved thereby may appear and oppose
final settle1nent and distribution, or may appeal within
the statutory time. An heir who has not contested a decree of final distribution made after notice, is forever
foreclosed - unless fraud has intervened. 75-11-37 UCA
1953; In re Estate of Rice 111 U. 428, 182 P. 2d 111.
Since the Court did what it had power and jurisdiction to do under our statutes; its action cannot now
be attacked with success.
The California cases cited by appellants do not con:;true our statute nor are they in point. The Devoe case
(Estate of James Devoe, Deceased, Myrick's Probate
Reports, p. 6) is a Superior Court case in 1872. It is
extremely terse and simply recites a holding to the effect
that an attorney appointed for a 1ninor cannot stipulate
to withdraw an action contesting a will and thereby bind
the minor who later, through another attorney, seeks to
contest the will. The Fuller case (Estate of William P.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6
~uller, Deceased, 2 Coffey's Probate Decisions 521) is
also a Superior Court case. It holds that an attorney
~ppointed to rep:resent a minor heir in a probate proceeding. may collect a fee frmn the minor's distributive
share, rather than the estate as such, and further decides
that the attorney involved claimed too much as his fee.
The quotation from 11 Cal Jur, Sec. 793, p. 1204 is
merely a discourse on the California statute now
repealed.

In re Lux Estate (Cal) 66 P 30 simply holds that
a court may appoint an attorney for non-resident heirs
only if they do not have an attorney of their own choosing, and when such an attorney is appointed, his fee cannot be fixed in advance. The case contains much loose
dicta. In re Otting's Estate (SD) 252 NW 740 held that
an attorney appointed to represent absent heirs is entitled
to a fee for his services from the estate. After quoting
from the Lux case, the Court says that the result there
reached is wrong. In any event, these cases are not in
point here.
POINT III
THE DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION IS VALID.

It is ndw argued for the first time that the Court
lacked judicial power to render the decree. Certain cases
are cited which have no relevency here. In the 'Vinona
Oil case (Winona Oil Co. li. Barues (Okla) 200 P 981)
the Court failed to order l:iale to the highest bidder as
required by law, so its order of sale to a certain company
hy name without bids wa:-; void. Other <'ases are cited
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to the effect that a judg1nent void on its face cannot
stand and that lack of jurisdiction or power or a legally
organized tribunal will render a judgn1ent void. With
this we can agree, but what i8 its application heref Are
appellants now 8aying that the decree is void on its face 1
If so, how'? Are they saying that our Probate Court was
not legally organized, or had no jurisdiction over the res
of the estate, or lacked power to issue its decree of distribution. If so, they have failed to point out any such
defects. Our duly constituted Probate Court was properly invested with jurisdiction of the estate of James
John Latsis. It properly exercised its powers in accordance with statute to cause all proper claims to be paid,
to determine heirs, to determine distributive shares, to
settle and distribute the estate and to discharge the
administrators.
CONCLUSION
This appeal frmn the Order of the District Court
should be dismissed.
Respectfully sub1nitted,
..\IOSS & HYDE
Attorneys for Respondent

Yirginia Latsis Zmnbukos
~lULLINER,

PRINCE & l\lULLINER
Attorneys for Respondent
Utah Savings & Trust Cmnpany
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

